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A. Introduction
The standard of cate for counsel
representing a claimant injuted in an
auto accident is to identify evety
applicable poJicy of insurance under
which the claimant may be an insuted.
The more serious the injury and dam-
ages, the more cdtical this investiga-
tion becomes. In Montana, many
individuals conduct their business, be
it ranching, farming retail sales, or
construction through a closely-held
or family corpotation. Sometimes an
individual or a married couple are the
sole shareholdets. The family mem-
bers are also likely the officers and
directors of the corporation.
Commonly, the family wjll insure
its petsonal autos separately under
individual auto policies whjle insur-
ing those identified with the business
or owned by the cotpotation under a
coÍporate auto policy. One reason fot
this arrangement is the tax deductibil-
ity of the premiums for those ve-
hicles used in the business as a
business expense. The shareholders
may not deduct às 
^ 
corpora;te busi-
ness expense those premiums for the
vehicles they own and use personally.
The insurer, howevet, does not want
the risk associated with auto insur-
ance to be covered undet more than
one of the company's policies.
The corporation is normally
desþated as the "named insuted"
on the corporate auto policy. Hov/-
ever, that poJicy will likeþ contain
coverages such as Urrinsured Motor-
ist, Underinsured Motorist, and
Medical Pay each of which makes
reference to and provides benefits for
"bodily injury'' and "damages for
bodily injury and death." It is logical
to assume that the sole shareholders,
employees, officers, and directors of
a company will be covered under the
policy. In fact, virtually everyone who
is injured whìle occupying the ve-
hicles owned and insured by the cor-
poration will be considered
"insureds" for purposes of the policy
benefìts. Provisions of those policies
include the precondition that the
insured be "occupying" a vehicle to
recover benefìts as an insured.
Howevef, coverages such as
Uninsured Motorist, Underinsured
Motorist, and Medical Pay are tradi-
tionally thought of and, at least in the
cases of UM and UIM, treated by the
courts as personal and portable cov-
erages which 
^tta'ch 
to the insured
persons to provide them benefits
even when they are not in the insured
vehicle described on the declarations
page.
It is axiomatic that, in cases in-
volving catasttophic injury and latge
damages, counsel wtJJ. analyze any
auto policy issued to closeþheld or
family corporations in which the
claimant is a shareholder, officer, or
director to determine whether any
benefit could be obtained under that
policy. The starting point, after ascer-
taining the facts of the accident, is to
secure 
^ 
copy of the corporate auto
policy and the Declarations page.
The critical question for analysis is
whether the claimant is an "insured"
under the appropriate UM, UIM, or
Med Pay coverage.
Montana State and Federal courts
have decided several cases involving
attempts to secure coverage for an
injured individual undet a corporate
auto policy. This article will review
those cases to reveal the arguments
used to invoke coverage and the
rulings the courts have made.
B. Corporate Covetage and the
Injured Pedestrian
1. Hager u. American l7est (1.989)
In what appears to be the seminal
Montana case, Federal Judge Hatfield
found coverage for an individual
shateholder under a corporate auto
policy in Hager u. American Ilest Ins.
Co.,732 F,Supp. 1,072 Q. Mont.
1989). Colleen Hager was a share-
holdet in a closeþ held family corpo-
ratj:on, Hager's, Inc. She was strLrck as
a pedestrian by a hit-and-run auto in
a paÁ<tnglot in Bozeman. She sought
to recover under the Uninsured Mo-
torist coverage on the auto policy
issued to Hagers, Inc. by American
S7est.
Hager's, fnc. was the only
"named insured" on the poJicy.
Judge Hatfìeld pointed out that the
determinative issue was whether
Colleen Hager'was an "insured"
within the meaning of the policy.
The UM coverage of the,\medcan
I7est policy defìned an insured as:
l. Yoa or any farztiþ memben
2. Anyone else occuþling a
covered auto or a. tempol'ary
substitute for a covered aøto.
Ämedcan nØest argued, and
Colleen Hager conceded, that Hagers,
Inc. was the "named insured" under
the policy. r\merican'SØest asserted
that a cotporate named insured could
not have any "family member."
Hager contended that, as a minority
shareholder in a closeþ-held family
corporation, she was an additional
insured under the policy so as to be
"You ot any famiþ member," a class
of persons who did not need to be
Tru¡r TneNos - AuruuN 2008 PecB 29
"occupying2' a covered auto to be an
insured. (Recall, as Judge Hatfìeld
pointed owt, that Jacobsen u. Implement
Dealers Mutual2 declared it against the
public poJicy of the UM srarute,
MCÂ $ 33-23-201, to condition UM
benefìts on the insured occupying the
auto.)
Judge Hatfield found the poticy
ambþous and held that Hager was
an insured saying, "The ambigulry in
the subject policy is created by utili-
zatton of the term "famïy member"
in a policy issued to a closeþ held
family corporation." Hatfield found
that his construction was 'lconsistent
with the remedial rìature of unin-
sured motorist statutes" and consis-
tent with "the generally accepted
princþle that the uninsured motorist
coverage of an insurance policy may
not limit the class of pensons covered
under the endorsement to a group
smaller than that covered under the
liabiJity provisions of the same
poìicy." The case is authotity for the
situation where, in Judge Hatfìeld's
wotds, "a corpotate entity is the
named insured under an automobile
Jiability poJicy providing uninsure{
motorist coverage."
2. Hanson u. Enþloyrs Matøal Casual4t
Conþan1 Q004)
Federal Judge Molloy awarded a
pedestrian underinsured motorist
benefits under a corporate policy on
the basis of ambiguity in Hanson u.
Emþloyrs Møtwal Casaallt Conþart.
There, Gary Hanson was struck by an
underinsured motor vehicle while
jogg.rg in Spokane. The tortfeasor's
insurer paid Hanson the 9100,000
limit of its Bodily Injury coverage.
Hanson and his wife were sole
shareholders of a closeþ held farrrily
corporation, P.H. Moller Co., Inc.,
which was the sole named insured on
àn avto poÌicy covering three vehicles
with Employers Mutual Casualty
Company. The policy provided Unin-
sured Motorisr coverage which in-
cluded an underinsured motorist
definition. The employer refused
Hanson's demand for UM/UIM
benefits under the policy on the
ground that he wasn't an "insured"
under the policy.
The UM coverage definition of
l'insured" construed by the court read
as follows:a
B. Who Is An Insured?
1. You.
2. If you are an individual,
any "fartily member."
3. A.nyone else "occupyìng2'a
covered "àvto" of tempo-
rary substitute for a covered
"auto." The covered "alto"
must be out of service
because of its breakdown,
repau, servicing, loss or
desttuction.
4. Ânyone for damages he or
she is entitled to recover
because of "bodily injury''
sustained by another
"insufed."
This defìnition is from the
Insutance Services Ofîtce 1997
commercial auto form CA 21 1,0 97.s
Most important to the court
v/as the fact that.the Medical Pay
coverage in part defìned an "insured"
differently as follows:
1. You while "occupying" or,
while a pedestrian, when
struck by any "at)to."
2. If you are an individual,
any "fam[y member"
whìle occupying or, while
a pedestrian, when struck
bY anY <(¿1¡¿g" * * *
Note that, to constfue "you" in
sub 1 to refer to the corporation
requires that the corporation be able
to "occupy'' a vehicle and be a "pe-
destian." Faced with this defìnition
in its Medica-l Pay coverage, the in-
surer had ùready paid three 95,000
limits of Med Pay coverage for
Hanson's medical bills, one for each
vehicle insured.
Though Judge Molloy ultimateþ
found coverage in Hanson, he dtd not
follow Hager,becaase he found the
defìnition of "insured" in Hansoru
differed from that in Hager and also
rejected the reasonable expectations
argument. He noted that the policy
in Hager defìned "insured" as "you
or any famtly member." In Hanson,
"insured" was defìned as "1. You,
2. If yorl ate 
^fl 
individual, any famtly
member." Hager! ambiguity, Molloy
asserted, arose from the factthat"it
included fu-ily members regardless
of whether the named insured was a
corporation or- an individual." Molloy
read the defìnition in Hanson to un-
ambþously require that anyone
other than a corporaion must be
occupying a vehicle owned by the
corporation at the time of injury.
Honoring the insured's "feason-
able expectations" can be a logical
and viable argument where a corpo-
rate entity is the named insured on
^n 
avto policy providing UM/UIM
benefits. The doctrine provides that
the objectively reasonable expecta-
tions of insurance purchasers about
the terms of their policies should be
honored even if a painstaking study
of the poJicy would negate those
expectations.6 The Hansons arguecl
that, as sole corporate shareholders,
they expected that Íbodily injuty'' in
the policy referred to their bodily
injury. ,{t the least, they argued, the
ptovision creates ambiguity that must
be resolved in favor of the insured.
Moreover, Judge Molloy conceded
that, if the Hansons paid premiums
through their corporation for the
covefage, they were entitled to
coverage. He cited Rzckdaschel u. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., (1.997)7 and
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Bennelt u. State Farm Mat Aato Ins.,
(1993)8 for the twin princþles that an
insurer may not place in an insutance
policy a provision that defeats cover-
age for which the insurer has received
valuable considetation," àflà "art
insurer is not allowed to deny cover-
age for which it has received valuable
considetation." Nevertheless, Judge
Molloy reasoned that valuable cover-
age \r/as provided only if Hanson
occupied a corporate vehicle at the
t-ime of injury. He asserted that it was
Flanson's status as a pedestrian that
took him out of the coverage.
The critical question then became
whether it is legal to limit the class of
people who can recoveÍ UM/UIM
benefits under a corporate auto policy
to those who occupy corporate autos.
Recall that it is against public policy
to require that the named insured
under an individual auto policy must
occupy the insured vehicle to recover
UM bene{ìts. Jacobrcn u. Implenerut
Dealer¡ Mwtaal (1982)e, Howevet,
under Chilberg u. Rose (1995)10, it is
not aga.inst public policy to require
that passengers other than named
insureds and their family members be
occupying the vehicle insured on the
declarations page to obtain UM ben-
efìts. In Hanson,Judge Molloy held it
legal to limit UM/UIM coverage to
those occupying the corporate ve-
hicles. He reasoned that, though
UM/UIM coverage is personal and
portable, and though "Montana pub-
Jic policy supports a broad intetpreta-
tion of uninsuted motorist coveragel'
there is no requirement that "such
coverage be sold irrespective of an
auto insurance policy." He said, "I
think, therefore, thàt as long as it is
legal for an insurer to sell an automo-
bile liability polìcy to a corporation,
which is the named insured, it is legal
for the insurer to limit the class of
covered individuals to those who ate
occupying covered vehicles at the
time they are injured." At that point
in the court's decision, it appeated
Hanson had lost.
However, the conflict in defìni-
tion of the insured in the Medical Pay
coverage was Hanson's salvation.
Employers Mutual used a completely
different defìnition of insured in
the Medical Pay coverage where it
defìned an insured as:
1. You while "occupying2' or,
while a pedestrian, when
struck by any "^vto."
Since a corporation could not
occupy an auto ot be a pedesüian,
the definition, and its conflicting
counterpart in the UM coverage
produced ambiguity. Recall that the
insurer resolved the Med Pay defìni-
tion by stacking Medical Pay coverage
for Hanson for all three autos owned
by the corporation. That placed the
insurer in the position of arguing that
it could interpret "you" in the Med
Pay defìnition to include Flanson
individually while interpreting "you"
in the UM defìnition to mean onl¡¡
the corporation.
Judge Molloy said that corìstruc-
tion of tetms and phrases in the
policy must reconcile all parts of the
contract. Faced with the ambiguity
of the two defìnitions, he resolved it
in favor of the insured holding that,
by itself, the UM definition of in-
suted was not ambþous. It legiti-
mately excluded coverage of
individuals not occupying corporate
vehicles, Nevertheless, the implicit
recognition of "you" as an individual
in the Med Pay coverage meant that
the policy taken as a whole was arn-
bþous regarding who was an
insured tequiring coverage for Hanson.
C. Corporate Coverage and the
Iniured Driver
1.. Lierboe u. State Farn Q004)
L;ierboe u. State Farru Mat. Auto Ins.
Co. Q004)n also involved 
^n 
attempt
by a shareholder of a closely-held
corporation to obtain benefìts under
a policy issued to the corporation.
IGistine Lierboe was injured in an
auto collision whjle driving a Jeep
Chetokee insured under her personal
auto policy with State Farm. The
policy had Medical Payments cover-
age limits of $5,000. She was also a
shareholder in a corporation, Shining
Mountain Desþ and Construction,
and that company had two auto in-
surance policies issued by State Farm
covering a 1.991. Dodge Dakota
pickup truck and a 1.970IHC flatbed
truck. The Dodge had Med Pay limits
of $5,000, while the IHC had no
Med Pay coverage.
Subsequent to the accident, the
Montana Supreme Court, in
Rackda¡chel u. State Farm Mat. Aato Ins.
Co., (1.997), upheld the stacking of
Medical Pay coverage. When
Lierboe's medical expense exhausted
the Med Pay limits on her Jeep, she
sought the Med Pay limit on the
corporation's Dodge Dakota which
State Farm refused. She sued State
Farm in Federal court, andJudge
-t
'Trial U jrrl mast be preseraed: not as a mere formalit), striþþed of its discretion b1t arbitrarJ and
tnflexible røles dictated b1t the caþtains o¡f commerce and indastrl for the førtberance of their own
selfsh interest, batfree to searclt oat andfnd the truþ essentialjastice of each indiuidaal case."
J. Kendall Few, In Defense of Trial @ þr1 (1992)
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Molloy certifìed to the Montana Su-
preme Coutt two issues: (1) Is a
shareholder or relative of a share-
holder of a closely-held corporarion
covered by an automobile liability
policy issued to the closely-held cor-
poration when the terms of the
poJicy include coverage reference to
"relatives"? (2) Given the facts of
this case, if Iftistine Lierboe is cov-
ered under the Shining Mountain
Desþ and Construction, Inc., policy,
does the anti-stacking holding in
Rzckdaschel apply undet the terms of
these poJicies?
Unfortunately for our purposes,
the Montana Supreme Coutt did not
address the frst issue because it
found the second dispositive, holding
that there was no coverage on the
Dodge because it contained an
owned auto exclusion limiting cover-
age if Lierboe was not occupying the
vehicle "insuted under this coverage."
The coutt ruled that "this coverage"
referred to the poLicy on the Dodge
so that thete was no coverage for
injuty in any othet vehicle.
Of sig4ificance to our discussion
is the court's statement that "The
distinction between named insureds
and those who qualify as insureds
only by virtue of their occupancy in
the vehicle was pointed out in
Chilberg a. Rose (1995), 273 Mont. 4I4,
903 P.2d 1377;' Chilberg v/as a pas-
senger who was not a named insured.
The Chilberg coutt said, "Chìlberg
v/as â passenger who neither had
'reasonable expectations' of covetage
under the policy nor did he qualify as
an insured spouse or family membet
under more than one pohcy."12
Hence, the court 'tn Uerboe said that
Iftistine Lierboe had no reasonable
expectation of coverage because she
didn't quaJi$r as afl insuÍed.
Note that Lierboe was in part
overruled in Snn Farm Mwt Aato Ins.
Co. u. Gibson Q007).13In Gibson, the
Montana Supreme Court held that,
where those injured are named
insureds, the occupancy requirement
in Medical Pay coverage acts as an
anti-stacking device. Such a provision
is against the public poìicy that a
provision that permits an insurer to
receive valuable consideration for
coverage that is not provided violates
Montana public policy.
2. T}ae Short Life of Progressizte
Cas. Ins. Co, ts. Owen (2004)
The federal case of Progressiue
Cas. Ins. Co. u. Owenla again involved
a closely-held family corporation.
Arlene Owen and her husband,
Curtis, were the sole shareholders of
Bennett Owen Trucking for which
Arlene was the vice president, secre-
tary, and a dkector of the corpora-
tion. Bennett Owen Trucking was the
named insured orì a commercial auto
poJicy with Progressive u'hich insured
twelve dump trucks, ffactors, and
dump trailers. The declarations page
listed ten drivers which did not in-
clude r{.rlene whose name appeared
nowhere on the policy or declatations
pâge.
TRIALSMITH
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In 2003, Ätlene obtained a
commercial learner's permit from the
State of Montana to begin driving
commercial vehicles fot the business.
In February of 2004, she dtove a
truck tractor and flatbed ttailer
belonging to a man named Cornell
to a ranch site where she and Cornell
loaded hay. During loading, the load
shifted and a heavy bale fell on her
causing severe disabling injury.
She recovered $862,000 from the
insurance on Cornell's truck and
$100,000 UIM coverage limits from
het individual auto policy. She then
sought the UIM benefits undet
Progressive's poJicy with Bennett Owen
Trucking. Progressive tefused and
{ìled a federal declantory action that
the policy did not provide coverage.
The policy defìned an insured as
follows:
2. "Insured" means:
a. If the named insuted is a person:
i. You ot a relative.
ü.Ary other person occupying
your insured auto.
*x*
b, If the named insured is a
corporation, partnef ship,
orgarizatton, or aîy other entity
that is not a living person:
i. Ary person occupying your
insured auto.
Magistrate Judge Ândetson
declared the policy ambþous at the
outset noting ftst that it was issued
to a corpofation as the only named
insured whjle making "no explicit
provision for the owners, directors,
or offìcers of the company." After
noting the premiums on the dec page
for Medical Pay and Underinsured
Motorist coverage, Judge Anderson
said,'A corporation cannot suffer
bodily injury; it cannot obtain
medical treatment; it cannot incur
medical bills. Yet these are conditions
precedent to the collection of ben-
efìts under the UIM and medical
coverages." He said:
Thus it would be reasonable to
expect that a commercial
policy that purports to provide
uniqueþ human benefìts must
have intended to extend those
benefits to some person or
persons. The question is who?
Judge Anderson reasoned that
Progressive could not chatge premi-
ums for Med Pay and UIM coverage
and then deny the owrìers, officers,
and directors of the corporation
benefits on the ground that the only
named insured was the corporation.
The insured's reasonable expectations
could not be "defeated by this poody
drafted and nonsensical insurance
contract." Accotdingly, he declared
that the policy ptovided UIM and
medical benefìts for Adene for the
injuries sustained in Februaty 2006.
3. Progressiae Cø*Ins, Co, o, Owen
ovetruled at the Ninth Citcuit
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
disagreed and held in errot for the
district court to have reformed the
policy to cover,{.dene Owen.15 The
Ninth Circuit found it clear that the
"uniqueþ human benefìts" were
provided only to "any petson occupy-
ing yout insured auto." The court
ruled that the policy unambþously
provided benefìts to any person who
was injured whìle occupying one of
Bennett Owen Trucking's vehicles.
The Ninth Circuit found its ding
to be consistent with Judge Molloy's
statement from Hanson u. Enployrt
Mat. Cas. Co. in 2004:
As long as it is legal for an
insurer to sell an automobile
liabiJity policy to a corporation
which is the named insuted, it
is legal for the insurer to limit
the class of covered individu-
als to those who are occupying
covered vehicles at the time
they are injured.
The question remaining was
whether Arlene was occupying a
temporary substitute for a Bennett
Owen Trucking vehicle so that she
would be in "your (the corporation's)
insuted auto." The court granted
Ptogressive summary judgment on
the ground that Arlene had produced
no evidence that such was the câse.
4. Lee ø. Gredt Dir.)ide Insurance
Company 2008)
In l-ee u. Great Diuide Insurance
Corrpanl,l6Lee was injured in Helena
while driving his 2000 Ford pickup
which was insured by American
States Insurance. He was hit by Peters
who was driving inebdated without
insurance and on the wrong side of
the road. Lee had a company called
"Lee's Mobile Home Service" which
insuted two trailers and a 1993 Ford
pickup with Great Divide Insurance.
Lee sued tortfeasor Peters and Lee's
own UM insurer, American States,
and settled with ,\merican States on
the UM coverage. He then dismissed
American States and continued the
actton agatnst Petefs. ,\fter fìLing a
Second Amended Complaint against
Peters alone, Lee sent a copy to Great
Divide with a letter inviting that car-
rier to "Please take whatever action
you deem necessary to protect the
***
In addition, the policy defìned
"your insured auto" as follows:
10. tYour insuted autott means
c. Any auto not owned by you
whìle you are temporarjly
driving it as a substitute for any
other auto described in this
de{ìnition because of its with-
drawal from normal use due to
breakdown, repalr, servicing,
loss, ot destruction. . . .
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insured's interests regarding this
matter." He secured a $1.1 million
default judgment after a hearing on
the default of which Great Divide
had no notice. He then {iled a sepa-
rate action against Gteat Divide for
declaratory teJief, breach of contract,
bad faith, and punitive damages.
After hearing, the District Court
denied Lee's motion for summary
judgment and ¡aa tponte granted
Great Divide summary judgment
on the ground that its policy did not
cover Lee for the accident and that
Lee did not give proper notice of the
claim to Great Divide.
The issue pertinent to our
discussion is whether a corporate
policy that makes reference to "you"
and "insured" in the'qMho is an
insuted" section is ambiguous so
that it should cover persons afît\ated
with the cotporation such as owrìers,
offìcers, and directors. The Montana
Supreme Court held that the corpo-
rate policy limited coverage to those
occupþg vehicles listed in the
policy. The court reasoned that the
term "you" in the policy referred to
the corpotation. Lee had the opportu-
nity under the corporate policy to
elect one of nine different ways
to insure vehicles.lT He chose the
"specifically described'autos"' option
defined as listed autos only and did
not List his 2000 Ford Pickup truck.
,\s a result, Lee did not have cover-
age under the Great Divide poJicy,
which was consistent with his inten-
tions of removing his name from
the policy and only covedng his
corPorate vehicles.
The court said that Chilberg
(1995) supports limiting coverage to
the reasonable expectations of
insureds occuppng vehicles listed in
the poJicy at the time of the accident.
L;ierboe (2003) upheld denial of cover-
age whete an injured passenger was
in a vehicle that was not identified in
the corporate policy. The court said,
'qWe have not expanded coverage
to injured persons involved in the
corporation who are not occupying
vehicles covered under the policy at
the t-ime of the accident" and cited
Uerboe and Chilberg.
Conclusion
Assuming an injured claimant is
not a "flamed insured" on a cofpo-
rate auto policy, determination of
whether that individual is otheru¡ise
an "insured" invariably leads to
analysis of the defìnition of "in-
sufed" ot the "who is insured"
sectjon of a coverage. The definition
should be read critically to see
whether it is subject to more than
one reasonable interpretation making
it ambþous.18 If it is ambiguous, it
must be construed in favor of the
insured.re Moreover, it is important to
compafe the definition of insured in
each of the coverage sections, which
are likely different and may, as in
Hanson, produce ambiguity because
they are different.
If the insured recently changed
the definition of insured in a corpo-
rate auto policy so that it cleaÃy
excludes the individual shareholder,
offìcer, ot director where it argaably
included them before, then that
may be a renewal "on less favorable
terms" requiring a 45-day written
notice from the ìnsurer to be
effective.20
Even if the policy is not ambigu-
ous, given the fact that a closely-held
fam)Iy cotporation is involved, the
client may truly have had a reason-
able expectation that he or she was
covered under the corporate policy
for UM, UIM, or Med Pay. Counsel
can investigate why some autos were
covered under a corporate policy and
others under individual policies. rù(/as
this a ranch or farm business where
vehicles are used for both personal
and business purposes? Is there some
angle where the insured had a reason-
able expectation of coverage regatd-
less of lack of ambiguity in the
policy or declarations?21
Finally, checking the case annota-
tions to particular defìnition(s) of
"insured" under the coverages in
Miller's Standard Insutance Policies
,A.nnotated will reveal if courts in
other jurisdictions have found your
particular provision ambiguous, in
violation of reasonable expectations,
or void as against public policy.
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